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New Indicators for the Mobile Banking Nexus
Abstract
Purpose: We make available new critical macroeconomic financial indicators to the research 
community. Nothing is more powerful than a phenomenon whose time has come. What is the 
macroeconomic empirical context of growing mobile banking? Perhaps one of the deepest 
empirical hollows in the financial development literature has been the equation of financial 
depth in the perspective of money supply to liquid liabilities. This equation has put on the 
margin, a burgeoning phenomenon whose time has come: mobile banking.  
Design/Methodology: We decompose financial depth into formal, semi-formal and informal 
sectors and then assess the incidence of mobile banking on each constituent. Thus the IFS 
(2008) definition  of  the  financial  system is  extended to incorporate  an informal  financial 
sector in line with Asongu(2011). Three hypotheses based on eight propositions are tested 
using a plethora of endogeneity-robust and HAC standard errors estimation techniques. 
Findings: The informal financial sector (a previously missing component in the definition of 
money supply: M2) is positively affected by mobile banking, while the incidence of mobile 
banking  is  negative  on  formal  and  semi-formal  financial  intermediary  development.  The 
paper contributes at the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial 
development  and  responds  to  the  growing  field  of  economic  development  by  means  of 
informal  financial  sector  promotion,  microfinance  and  mobile  banking.  It  suggests  a 
practicable way to disentangle the effects of mobile banking on various financial sectors.
Research implications: Since empirical research on the phenomenon has been hampered by 
lack  of  data,  we  make  available  macroeconomic  financial  indicators  to  the  research 
community. The present paper is also in response to the numerous calls on the research gap in 
the literature that emphasize the need for research on mobile banking. The mobile-finance 
nexus is gaining momentum, yet relatively little scholarly research explores the incidence of 
these m-banking/m-payment (systems) on financial development. 
Practical  implications:  (1) There is  a  burgeoning role  of informal  finance  in  developing 
countries.  (2)  The  incidence  of  the  growing  phenomenon  of  mobile  banking  cannot  be 
effectively assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators. 
(3) It is a wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial intermediary development 
indicators which will guide monetary policy; since a great chunk of the monetary base (M0) 
in less developed countries is now captured by mobile banking.
Originality/value:  New  financial  indicators  for  mobile  banking  assessment  based  on 
insufficiencies  in  the  financial  development  literature:  liquid  liabilities  as  applied  to 
developing countries  is  misleading because  a  great  chunk of  the  monetary base does  not 
transit through the banking system but via informal networks like the growing phenomenon of 
mobile banking.
JEL Classification: E00; G20; L96; O17; O33
Keywords: Banking; Mobile Phones; Shadow Economy; Financial Development; Africa 
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1. Introduction
In the words of Victor Hugo: ‘Nothing is more powerful than the idea whose time has  
come’ (Thacker  &  Wright,  2012).  As  of  January  2012,  there  were  5.2  billion  mobile 
connections  and  only  2.2  billion  people  with  bank  accounts.  Around  the  globe,  various 
initiatives  use  the  mobile  phone to  provide  financial  services  to  those  without  access  to 
traditional  banks,  yet  relatively  little  scholarly  research  explores  the  use  of  these  m-
banking/m-payment  systems  (Jonathan  & Camilo,  2008).  Hence  this  present  paper  is  in 
response to the numerous calls on the research gap in the literature that emphasize the need 
for research focusing on the context(s) of m-banking/m-payments(Jonathan & Camilo,2008,1; 
Maurer, 2008; Aker & Mbiti,2010,225; Thacker & Wright,2012,1).  
 Money transfer schemes have evolved to the next generation of electronic payments: 
the mobile channel. Money transfer services for both domestic and international remittances 
are  shifting  from  traditional  providers  to  wireless  carriers  who  are  able  to  compete  for 
consumer market share on the basis of technological ubiquity and affordable cost services. 
According to Jonathan & Camilo (2008), the spread of mobile phones across the developing 
world is one of the most remarkable technology stories of the past decade. Buoyed by prepay 
cards and inexpensive handset, hundreds of millions of first-time telephone owners have made 
voice calls and text messages part of their livelihoods. However, many of these same mobile 
users live in informal and/or cash economies without access to financial services. As posited 
by Porteous (2006) and sustained by  Thacker  & Wright (2012),  there are  probably more 
people with mobile handsets than with bank accounts in the developing world. The various 
initiatives   that  use mobile  phones to  provide financial  services  to  ‘the unbanked’  take  a 
variety of forms: including long-distance remittances, micropayments and informal airtime 
bartering  schemes;  and  go  by  various  names  including  mobile(m)-banking,  mobile(m)-
transfers or mobile(m)-payments. These payment mechanisms are no longer mere pilots as 
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they  are  gaining  considerable  ground  in  countries  like  the  Philippines,  South  Africa  and 
Kenya. However this increasing relevance,  scholarly research has been slow to keep even 
pace.
As  postulated by Maurer (2008) and confirmed in subsequent literature (Jonathan & 
Camilo,  2008;  Thacker  &  Wright,  2012),  scholarly  research  on  the  adoption  and 
socioeconomic impacts of m-banking (payments) systems in the developing world is scares. 
From  a  broad  standpoint,  most  studies  on  mobile  banking  have  been  theoretical  and 
qualitative in nature (Maurer,  2008; Jonathan & Camilo,  2008; Merritt,  2010;  Thacker & 
Wright, 2012). The few existing empirical papers hinge on country-specific and micro-level 
data(collected  from surveys)  for  the  most  part(Demombynes  & Thegeya,  2012).  Aker  & 
Mbiti(2010;225) have stated: “relative to the spread of some other technologies that have  
been introduced in sub-Saharan Africa - improved seeds, solar  cook stoves and agricultural  
technology - mobile phones adoption has occurred at a staggering rate on the continent. Yet  
few empirical economic studies have examined mobile phone adoption. This could be due to a  
variety  of  factors,  including  unreliable  or  nonexistent  data  on  individual  level  adoption  
(leading to measurement error)…”. Since empirical research on the phenomenon has been 
hampered  by  lack  of  data,  the  present  paper  makes  available  macroeconomic  financial 
indicators to the research community. 
The purpose of this study is therefore to give a macroeconomic context to the growing 
phenomenon of ‘mobile-banking/transfer/payments’.  It  contributes at  the same time to the 
macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responds to the growing 
field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion, micro finance and 
mobile banking. It suggests a practicable way to disentangle the effects of mobile banking on 
various financial sectors.  Its contribution to the literature is fourfold. Firstly, it corrects one of 
the deepest  empirical  hollows in  the  financial  development  literature  which has  been the 
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equation of financial depth in the view of money supply to liquid liabilities : this equation has 
sidelined  a  burgeoning  phenomenon  whose  time  has  come  (mobile  banking).  This  first 
contribution hinges on the thesis that financial depth in the perspective of liquid liabilities as 
applied to developing countries is very misleading because a great chunk of the monetary 
base does not transit through the banking system but via informal networks like the growing 
phenomenon of mobile-transfers (payments/banking). Secondly, the study is in response to a 
growing  call  for  more  scholarly  research  on  the  mobile-finance  nexus  that  is  gaining 
momentum around the world. Various initiatives on the use of the mobile phone are cropping-
up to provide financial  services to those without access to traditional banks, yet relatively 
little  scholarly research explores the incidence of these m-banking/m-payment  systems on 
financial  development(Jonathan & Camilo,2008,1;  Maurer,  2008; Aker & Mbiti,2010,225; 
Thacker & Wright,2012,1). Thirdly,  since empirical research on the phenomenon has been 
hampered  owing  to  lack  of  data,  this  paper  makes  available  macroeconomic  financial 
indicators to the research community that could practically be used to assess the incidence of 
mobile  banking on financial  development.  These indicators  can  easily  be computed  from 
existing World Development Indicators (WDIs) and the Financial Development and Structure 
Database (FDSD). Fourthly,  we provide relevant recommendations that could guide future 
research and macroeconomic policy on financial trends of the growing phenomenon.  
The  rest  of  the  paper  is  organized  as  follows.  Section  2  states  the  problem  and 
resulting  propositions.  Section  3  examines  theoretical  and  empirical  literature.  Data  and 
methodology are presented and outlined respectively in Section 4.  Empirical  analysis  and 
corresponding discussion are covered in Section 5.  Section 6 concludes. 
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2. Problem statement and propositions 
2.1 Problem statement 
2.1.1 Rethinking financial development indicators 
  Owing to lack of macroeconomic data, very little is known today about the impact of 
mobile banking across financial intermediary sectors. Perhaps this could explain the relative 
lack of research on the mobile finance (banking) nexus despite its growing significance in 
developing  countries.  Borrowing  from  Asongu  (2011a),  financial  development  indicators 
have been universally applied without due consideration to regional/country specific financial 
development realities (contexts). The application of some indicators for example hinges on 
the presumption that they are generally valid (Gries et al., 2009)1; notwithstanding empirical 
evidence that  not all  indicators  may really be relevant  in financial  development  (Asongu, 
2010a).  To the best of our knowledge, but for Beck et al.(1999) and Asongu(2010a;2011a), 
the absence  of  studies  that  underline  the quality  of  financial  development  indicators  with 
respect to contextual development concerns begs the search for the missing link. 
It has been well established that the financial depth indicator as applied to developing 
countries is very misleading as it does not integrate the realities and challenges of financial 
intermediary development (Demetriades & Hussein, 1996; Khumbhakar & Mavrotas, 2005; 
Ang & McKibbin, 2007; Abu-Bader & Abu-Qarn; 2008; Asongu, 2011a). Thus a motivation 
of this paper hinges on an existing debate over the contextual quality of financial development 
indicators. What best illustrates the missing dimension of the informal financial sector in the 
macroeconomic indicator of financial depth is a phenomenon whose era has come: ‘mobile 
banking’.  
1Gries et al. (2009) state: “In the related literature several proxies for financial deepening have been suggested,  
for example, monetary aggregates such as M2 on GDP. To date there is no consensus on the on the superiority of  
any indicator” (page 1851). 
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2.1.2 Rethinking financial development in the mobile banking (finance) nexus’ context
Liquid liabilities as applied to developing countries is  inconsistent because a great 
chunk of the monetary base does not transit  through the banking system but via informal 
networks like the growing phenomenon of mobile banking. As we have highlighted above, 
maybe one of the deepest empirical hollows in the financial development literature has been 
the equation of financial depth in the perspective of  money supply to liquid liabilities. This 
equation  has  put  on  the  margin,  a  burgeoning  phenomenon  whose  time  has  come.  This 
inconsistency begs the question of; what is the macroeconomic financial empirical context of 
growing ‘mobile-transfer/payments’? Is this context informal, formal or both? 
Beyond  the  empirical  need  of  distinguishing  between  formal,  semi-formal  and 
informal  sectors  of  financial  development,  the  above  questions  also  cut  deep  across  the 
conception and definition of the phenomenon (mobile banking) itself. That is, mobile banking 
could consists of ‘informal simple-savings’ and ‘bank oriented-savings’. Hence this reality 
further heightens the need to distinguish between the effect of ‘simple-savings’ which reflects 
informal  financial  development  (a  component  of  money  supply),  from that  of  ‘banking-
savings’  (the  liquid  liability  constituent  of  money supply).  Ultimately,  this  duality  in  the 
conception and definition of savings unravels the misleading assumption that financial depth 
in the perspective of monetary base is equal to liquid liabilities (as applied in mainstream 
financial development literature: World Bank 1989; King & Levine, 1993; Beck et al.,1999). 
2.1.3 Existing empirical solutions 
Money supply (M2/GDP) which represents the money stock has been widely used as a 
standard measure of liquid liabilities in many studies (World Bank 1989; King & Levine, 
1993).  While  this  proxy  maybe  quasi-true  in  the  developed  world,  its  application  to 
developing countries has faced growing skepticism. Proponents of this anti-thesis stress that 
in less developed countries; an improvement in M2 may reflect an extensive use of currency 
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rather  than  an  increase  in  bank  deposits.   Owing  to  the  absence  of  a  consensus  on  the 
superiority  of  financial  development  indicators;  especially  on  this  widely  used  proxy for 
financial depth (Gries et al., 2009), a number of solutions have been suggested. 
Firstly,  in  an  attempt  to  curtail  this  shortcoming,  Demetriades  &  Hussein  (1996) 
suggested the subtraction of currency outside banks from M2 in the measurement of liquid 
liabilities  in  developing  countries.  Abu-Bader  &  Abu-Qarn  (2008)  amongst  others  have 
recently adjusted M2 in the same manner. But these adjustments fail to emphasize that the 
“adjusted-measure” constitutes the formal and semi-formal financial sectors. Moreover, the 
informal financial sector is ruled-out as marginal in this adjustment. 
Secondly, some authors have sought to address the issue by determining a variable that 
is broadly indicative of financial depth. They use the first principal component of M2/GDP 
and a combination  of  other  financial  indicators  (Khumbhakar  & Mavrotas,  2005;  Ang & 
McKibbin, 2007; Gries et al., 2009). By so doing they decrease the dimensionality of the set 
of variables without losing much information on the one hand; and on the other hand decrease 
problems related to the quality of M2 as a proxy for liquid liabilities. The set-back of this 
approach to a solution is that, for the most part financial depth is mixed with concepts of 
financial  activity (private  domestic  credit/GDP),  financial  size (deposit  bank assets/central 
bank  assets  plus  deposit  money  assets),  financial  allocation  efficiency(bank  credit/bank 
deposits)…etc. The contribution of this paper to existing literature(in the context of mobile 
banking) is to address this problem without mixing-up these financial concepts. 
Thirdly, Asongu (2011a) earlier addressed this problem in the finance-growth nexus 
without mixing-up financial concepts. He has provided a practical way of disentangling the 
effects  of formal,  semi-formal  and informal  financial  development  sectors  in  the  finance-
growth nexus. In opposition to other solutions highlighted above, the paper best fits into the 
context of Asongu (2011a) because it seeks to capture the effect of ‘mobile banking’ which 
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from intuition predominantly reflects the semi-formal and informal sectors of the financial 
system. 
2.2 Theoretical basis, definition of terms, propositions and testable hypotheses 
2.2.1 Theoretical basis for propositions 
‘Liquid  liabilities’  as  expressed  in  terms  of  M2 is  without  distinction  of  financial 
sectors and rest on the assumption that almost all currency held is linked to a financial sector 
deposit(IFS,2008). Beck et al., (1999) on presenting a new database on financial development 
and structure (FDSD) pointed-out: “Since many researchers have focused on the liability side  
of  the  balance  sheet,  we  include  a  measure  of  absolute  size  based  on liabilities.  Liquid  
liabilities to GDP equal currency plus demand and interest-bearing liabilities of banks and  
other financial intermediaries divided by GDP. This is the broadest available indicator of  
financial  intermediation,  since it  includes all  three financial  sectors....Liquid liability  is  a  
typical measure of financial depth  and thus the overall size of the financial sector without  
distinguishing  between  financial  sectors  of  the  use  of  liabilities”(page  11).  It  is  worth 
emphasizing that in this assertion, almost no distinction is made between different financial 
sectors in the FDSD; and the hypothesis of all constituents of  money supply being linked to  
the liability side of the balance sheet is questionable for developing countries.  Almost all 
currency held for transaction motives in developed countries are recycled in banks2. However, 
this is subject to controversy in the underdeveloped world and therefore distinction between 
formal, semi-formal and informal banking sectors is imperative for a critical assessment of the 
multidimensional effects of ‘mobile banking’. 
A bias in the definition of ‘financial  system deposits’ (aka liquid liabilities) by the 
International  Monetary Fund (IMF) is  also deserving of examination.  With respect  to the 
International Financial Statistics (hence IFS), the financial system is made-up of the formal 
2 Bank deposits are liquid liabilities. 
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and semi-formal sectors; that is deposit money banks and other financial institutions (see lines 
24,  25  and  45  of  IFS,  October  2008).  Whereas  this  definition  could  be  quasi-true  for 
developed countries, it fails to take account of the informal financial sector in developing and 
underdeveloped countries. This leaves us with some concern over the role of the informal 
sector in financial intermediary development and growth; especially at the advent of ‘mobile 
banking’; a fast growing phenomenon whose time has come.
2.2.2 Definition of terms 
a)  Monetary Supply
This refers to the amount of money in an economy.  This is the measure of the money 
supply  that  characteristically  includes  most  liquid  currencies.  Measures  of  money  are 
classified in levels of M, with the monetary base (M0) being the smallest and lowest M-level. 
Whereas base money can be described as the most acceptable liquid form of final payment, a 
broad measure  of  money supply (M1) adds demand  deposits  to  M0.  Less  liquid  savings 
accounts like ‘time deposits’ add up to M1 to define a broader money supply (M2). Large 
time  deposits,  institutional  money market  funds,  other  larger  liquid  assets  and short-term 
repurchase in turn sum up to M2 to make-up the broadest money supply (M3). With respect to 
the context  of the current  paper,  M2 is  more  appropriate  due to  the relative undeveloped 
financial sector of developing countries. In the less developed world, M0 could be assimilated 
to the informal financial sector, implying the monetary base (M0) for the most part is made-
up  of  informal  financial  activities.  As  earlier  emphasized,  when  formal  and  semi-formal 
banking sector deposits are integrated into M0, then a broad money supply definition (M2) is 
obtained.   Liquid  liabilities  should  thus  be  the  component  of  M2  circulating  within  the 
banking system (M2-M0). 
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b)  Liquid liabilities 
A liquid liability refers to  a debt  or claim that has been converted into cash as it 
becomes due. In the context of our work, it is assimilated to bank deposits in current and 
savings  accounts  (M2-M0).  Whereas  in  developed  countries  liquid  liabilities  could  be 
assimilated to M2 (as M0 is mostly held in the banking sector), in underdeveloped countries 
M0 quite often does not transit through the banking sector and hence by definition is not a 
bank liability. 
c)  Financial system by International Financial Statistics (IFS)
 
With regard to the IFS (2008), the financial system consists of deposit money banks 
(formal banking sector) and other financial institutions (semi-formal banking sector)3. This 
definition is ideal for developed countries (where-in M0 is part of the banking sector) but 
lacking in some substance in the underdeveloped world (where most cash-holders contained 
in M0 don’t have bank accounts). Thus according to this definition, financial depth is M2 
without  informal  finance.  Within  the  framework  of  this  paper,  contrary  to  mainstream 
literature  financial  depth  corresponds  to  M2 (including  the  informal  financial  sector).  By 
integrating this previously missing component the following propositions are derived.
2.2.3 Propositions 
Financial development could either be indirect (financial intermediary development- 
through the banking sector)  or  direct  (via financial  markets).  The context of this  study is 
limited  to  the former  type  of  financial  development.  Borrowing from Beck et  al.  (1999), 
indirect  indicators  could  further  be classified  into  financial  development  aspects  of  depth 
(M2 ), allocation efficiency4, activity5 and size6. Amongst these indicators, financial depth is 
3 See lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October 2008.
4 Bank credit on bank deposits.
5 Private domestic credit on GDP.
6 Deposit bank assets / Central bank assets plus deposit bank assets. 
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the most widely used in the finance-growth literature. By disentangling this financial depth 
into  its  inherent  constituents  and  relaxing  the  IFS definition  of  the  financial  system,  the 
following propositions could be derived. 
Table 1: Summary of propositions
Panel A: GDP-based financial development indicators
Propositions Name(s) Formula Elucidation
Proposition  1
Formal  financial 
development 
Bank deposits/GDP Bank deposits7  here refer to demand, time 
and saving deposits in deposit money 
banks.
Proposition  2
Semi-formal 
financial 
development
(Financial deposits – 
Bank deposits)/ GDP
Financial  deposits8 are  demand,  time  and 
saving  deposits  in  deposit  money  banks 
and other financial institutions. 
Proposition  3
Informal  financial 
development
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/GDP
Proposition  4
Informal and semi-
formal financial 
development 
(Money  Supply –  Bank 
deposits)/GDP
Panel B: Measures of financial sector importance
Proposition 5
Financial 
intermediary 
formalization
Bank deposits/ Money 
Supply(M2)
From ‘informal and semi-formal’ to formal 
financial development (formalization)9 .
Proposition 6
Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization’
(Financial deposits - 
Bank deposits)/ Money 
Supply
From ‘informal and formal’ to semi-formal 
financial development (Semi-
formalization)10
Proposition 7
Financial 
intermediary 
‘informalization’
(Money Supply – 
Financial deposits)/ 
Money Supply
From ‘formal and semi-formal’ to informal 
financial development (Informalisation)11
Proposition 8
Financial 
intermediary ‘semi-
formalization and 
informalization’ 
(Money Supply – Bank 
Deposits)/Money Supply 
Formal to ‘informal and semi-formal’  
financial development: (Semi-
formalization and informalization) 12
N.B: Proposition 5, 6, 7 add up to unity (one); arithmetically spelling-out the underlying assumption of sector importance.  
Hence, when their series properties are considered in empirical analysis, the evolution of one sector is to the detriment of 
other sectors and vice-versa. 
7 Lines 24 and 25 of International Financial Statistics (IFS); October 2008. 
8 Lines 24, 25 and 45 of IFS, October, 2008. 
9 In  undeveloped  countries  M2 is  not  equal  to  liquid  liabilities  (liquid liabilities  equal  bank deposits:  bd).  
Whereas in undeveloped countries bd/M2<1, in developed countries bd/M2 is almost equal to 1.  This indicator 
measures the rate at which money in circulation is absorbed by the banking system. Financial formalization here 
is defined as the propensity of the formal banking system to absorb money in circulation.
10 This indicator measures the level at which the semi-formal financial sector evolves to the detriment of formal 
and informal sectors.
11 This proposition show the rate at which the informal financial sector is developing at the cost of formal and 
semi-formal sectors. 
12 The proposition appreciates the deterioration of the formal banking sector to the benefit of other sectors 
(informal and semi-formal). From common sense, propositions 5 and 8 should be perfectly antagonistic, meaning 
the former (formal financial development at the expense of other sectors) and the later (formal sector 
deterioration) should display a perfectly negative coefficient of correlation (See Appendix 2).
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Propositions in Table 1 are based on a rethinking of the IFS (2008) definition of the 
financial  system as elucidated  in  Section 2.1 above and summarized  in  Appendix 4.  The 
Asongu (2011a) definition integrates a previously missing component of informal finance into 
the definition of the financial system. Thus the empirical section is this paper is based on this 
definition  which  incorporates  the  informal  financial  sector  into  the  financial  system.  The 
propositions invite the following hypotheses.
2.2.4 Testable hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The informal financial sector (a previously missing component in the definition 
of money supply: M2) is significantly impacted by mobile banking. 
Hypothesis  2:  Disentangling  different  components  of  the  existing  measurement  (financial 
system)  into  formal  (banking  sector)  and  semi-formal  (other  financial  institutions)  sector 
indicators could improve understanding of the mobile-finance nexus. 
Hypothesis  3:  Introducing  measures  of  sector  importance  could  ameliorate  the  ability  to 
understand  how  improvements  of  shares  in  different  sectors  of  the  financial  system  are 
affected by the mobile banking phenomenon. To put this in other terms, the need to evaluate 
how  one  financial  sector  develops  at  the  expense  of  another  (and  vice-versa)  and  the 
incidence of mobile banking on these changes could be crucial in grasping the mobile-finance 
nexus. . 
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3. Theoretical framework 
3.1 The mobile-finance nexus 
With  respect  to  Jonathan  &  Camilo  (2009),  most  mobile  transactions13 in  the 
developing world enable users to do three things. (a) Store value (currency) in an account 
accessible via a handset. Should the user already have a bank account; the task becomes that 
of linking to a bank account. If the user does not have an account, then the process creates a 
bank account for him/her or creates a pseudo bank account, held by a third party or the user’s  
mobile operator. (b) Convert cash to and out of the store value account. When the account is 
connected to a bank account,  then users can visit banks to cash-in and cash-out. In many 
cases, users can also visit the GSM providers’ retail stores. In a great many flexible services, a 
user can visit a corner kiosk or grocery store (maybe the same one where he/she purchases 
airtime) and transact with an independent  retailer  working as an agent for the transaction 
system.  (c)  Transfer  stored  value  between  accounts.  Users  can  generally  transfer  funds 
between accounts connected to two mobile phones, by using a set of SMS messages (or menu 
commands) and PIN codes. The new services offer a way to move money from place to place 
and present an alternative to the payments system offered by banks, remittance firms, pawn 
shops  …etc.  The  uptake  of  m-banking  systems  has  been  particularly  significant  in  the 
Philippines(where three million customers use systems offered by mobile operators Smart & 
Globe;  Neville,2006); Kenya(where nearly two million users registered with the Safaricom 
M-PESA  system within a year of its nationwide rollout, Vaughan,2007; Ivatury & Mas,2008) 
13 In order to have a mobile money account and make a deposit, a customer must own a cell phone SIM card 
with the mobile operator and register for a mobile money account. The customer then makes cash deposits at the  
physical  offices of one of the operator‘s mobile money agents. These cash deposits create electronic money 
credit in the account. Customers can make person-to-person transfers of mobile money credit to the accounts of 
other mobile money users in the same network. They can also use their mobile money credit to pay bills and to 
buy phone airtime. Withdrawals  (conversion to cash) could be made at the offices  of the network‘s mobile  
money agents. There is also a possibility for a mobile money customer to make a transfer to someone who is not 
registered with the same network. In this case,  when notice of the transfer is received through an SMS text  
message, the recipient can receive the cash at a mobile money agent (Demombynes, & Thegeya, 2012).
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and South Africa where 450, 000 people use Wizzit(‘the bank in your pocket’;  Ivatury & 
Pickens, 2006) or one of two other national systems(Porteous,2007). 
Demombynes, & Thegeya(2012) have examined the mobile-finance nexus through the 
concept  of  savings.  They distinguish  two categories  of  mobile  savings.  (a)  Basic  mobile 
savings; which is simply the use of a standard mobile money system such as M-PESA to store 
funds. These basic mobile savings do not generate interest. Bank-integrated mobile savings 
have received a great deal of attention as a way to provide banking services to the poor. They 
have the edge of offering access to basic banking services without requiring close proximity 
to a physical  bank branch.  With a bank-integrated mobile  savings account,  basic  banking 
services can be accessed through a network of mobile phone agents, which in Kenya surpass 
the  weight  of  bank branches  by a  factor  of  100 to  1(Mas & Radcliffe,  2011).  The term 
‘partially integrated’ mobile savings system is also employed to describe situations where 
bank account access via mobile phones is contingent on the establishment of a traditional 
account at a physical bank. 
Banks  are  starting  to  build  their  own agent  networks  in  a  bid  to  assume  a  more 
competitive  bargaining position  in  accessing  mobile  service  platforms.  Partially  and fully 
integrated savings present different types of contracts among the partnering bank and mobile 
service provider. With respect to Demombynes & Thegeya(2012), on the one hand a partially 
integrated product clearly delineates the role of the bank(which provides and owns banking 
services)  from  that  of  the  mobile  service  provider(which  provides  mobile  telephony 
infrastructure and controls the agent network). Therefore the bank compensates the mobile 
service provider  for  access to  the network and enjoys  the remaining profits.  This sort  of 
contract more closely looks like a debt contract among parties. On the other hand, a fully 
integrated  solution  may  not  draw the  same  distinction  between  bank  and mobile  service 
providers.  In this  case,  the distribution of surplus is  dependent  on the relative  bargaining 
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power of the bank and mobile service provider. This type of contract more closely looks like 
an equity contract between two parties. Equity-like contracts are more likely to be complex 
and hence more difficult to negotiate than debt-like contracts; there-by presenting a potential 
hurdle towards the goal of increasing access. 
Ondiege(2010) Chief Economist of the African Development Bank views the mobile-
banking nexus from four standpoints. Firstly, the mobile phone can serve as a virtual bank 
card where institution and customer information can be securely stored, there-by avoiding the 
cost of distributing cards to customers. In fact he postulates, the subscriber identity module 
(SIM) card inside most (if not all) mobile phones is in itself a smartcard (similar to the virtual  
bank card). Thus, the banks customer’s PIN and account number can be stored on this SIM 
card to perform the same functions as the bank virtual card. Secondly, the mobile phone may 
play the role of a point of sale (POS) terminal. As such a mobile phone could be used to  
communicate  and  transact  with  the  appropriate  financial  institution  to  solicit  transaction 
authorization. These are similar functions of a POS terminal at mails, retail or other stores. A 
mobile phone can duplicate these functionalities with ease. Thirdly, the mobile phone can also 
be substituted for an ATM. A POS is therefore used to pay for goods and services at the store. 
If cash and access to savings were to be assimilated to ‘goods and services’, that customers 
buy and store, then the POS will also serve as cash ‘collection and distribution’ point which 
basically is the function of an automatic teller machine(ATM). Fourthly, the mobile phone 
could be used as an Internet banking terminal. Meaning it could provide two fundamental 
customer services: a) ability to make payments and transfers remotely; and b) instant access to 
any account.  Hence the mobile  phone device and wireless  connectivity  bring the internet 
terminal into the disposal of otherwise unbanked customers.  
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3.2 Bases for instruments 
The bases for the choice of instrumental variables are elucidated in this section. Thus 
we provide theoretical  justification  to  the  empirical  validity  of  legal-origin,  income-level, 
religious-domination and press-freedom instrumental variables.  
 3.2.1 Legal origins and financial development 
This section elucidates the law and finance theory. We devote space to spell-out the 
difference in how legal heritage continue to shape private property rights protection, investor 
protection laws and financial development in our era. In this section, we also explain two 
mechanisms via which legal-origin may influence the contracting environment: the political 
and adaptability mechanisms.  
a) Law, enforcement and financial development 
The first strand of the law and finance theory stresses that legal institutions influence 
corporate finance and financial  development  (La Porta et  al.,  1998). The law and finance 
theory emphasizes that cross-country differences in (i) contract,  company,  bankruptcy and 
security  laws,  (ii)  the  legal  system’  emphasis  on  private  property  rights,  and  (iii)  the 
efficiency of enforcement  influence  the degree of expropriation and hence the confidence 
with which people purchase securities and take part in financial markets. As asserted by La 
Porta et al.(2000) and backed by Beck & Levine(2005) the law and finance view follows 
naturally  from the  evolution  of  corporate  finance  theory  during  the  past  half  century.  A 
country’s  contract,  company,  security and bankruptcy laws, as well  as the enforcement  of 
these  laws  fundamentally  influence  the  rights  of  securities  holders  and  the  operation  of 
financial systems.  Debt and equity are viewed by Modigliani & Miller (1958) as legal claims 
on the cash flow of firms; statutory law and the degree to which courts enforce those laws 
shape the types of contracts that are used to address agency problems (Jensen & Meckling, 
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1976). Financial economists have increasingly focused on the control that financial securities 
bring to their owners and the effect of different legal rules on corporate control (Hart, 1995).
Concerning how legal establishments should influence corporate finance and financial 
development, within a broad vision there are differing opinions regarding the degree to which 
legal systems should support the private contractual arrangements and the degree to which the 
legal  system  should  have  specific  laws  concerning  shareholder  and  creditor  rights.  With 
respect  to  the  Coasians  (Coase,  1960),  the  legal  system  should  simply  enforce  private 
contracts.  Thus  effective  legal  establishments  permit  knowledgeable  and  experienced 
financial market participants to design a vast array of sophisticated private contracts in a bid 
to improve complex agency problems (Coase, 1960; Stigler, 1964; Easterbrook & Fischel, 
1991).   The law and finance theory three-point  view has  already been highlighted  in  the 
introduction of this strand. Whether assuming a Coasian dependence on enforcing complex 
private contracts or an approach that augments the support of private contracts with company,  
bankruptcy, securities law…etc, the law and finance’s first part postulates that the degree of 
protection of private investors is a paramount determinant of financial development. 
b)  From legal-origin to finance: political and adaptability mechanisms
In the second strand we stress theories by Beck et al. (2003) which assess ‘why’ legal 
origin matter in financial development.  They assess two mechanisms by which legal origins 
may influence financial development: the political and adaptability channels. 
The political mechanism is based on two premises. Firstly, legal traditions differ in the 
emphasis they attribute to protecting the rights of private investors in comparison to those of 
the state. Secondly, private property rights protection makes-up the foundation for financial 
development.  Hence  historical  based  differences  in  legal  origin  can  help  explain  existing 
disparities in financial development with regard to this component of law and finance (La 
Porta et al., 1998).  A great many scholars postulate that the Civil law has tended to support 
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the rights of the State, vis-à-vis private property rights, that is quite the opposite in Common 
law. Therefore Civil  law countries have provided for legal systems which have unhealthy 
implications for financial development. A powerful State with a responsive civil law at its 
disposal will tend to divert the flows of society’s resources towards favored ends, which is not 
conducive (appealing) to competitive financial markets. More so a powerful State will have 
difficulty credibly committing to not interfere in financial markets, which will also obstruct 
financial development. Thus, the law and finance theory emphasizes that Civil law countries 
will have feebler property rights protection and lower thresholds of financial  development 
than countries with other legal traditions. In contrast, Common law has historically tended to 
side with private property owners against the State.  According to this perspective, instead of 
becoming a tool of the state, Common law has acted as a powerful arm in the brandishing of 
private property rights. Rajan & Zingales(2003) stress that governments in Civil law countries 
were more effective than governments  in Common law countries in stretching the role of 
government  at  the cost of financial  market  growth during the Interwar period 1919-1939. 
They attribute this difference to the heavy task of the judiciary vis-à-vis the legislature. Thus, 
the  law  and  finance  theory  stresses  that  the  British  Common  law  supports  financial 
development to a greater extent than Civil law systems. 
The second channel binding legal origin to financial development is the adaptability 
channel that is also built on two premises. Firstly, legal systems differ in their ability to adjust  
to changing and evolving conditions. Secondly, if a country’s legal system adapts only timidly 
to changing circumstances (especially economic), large gaps will open between the financial 
needs of an economy and the ability of the legal system to support and fulfill those needs. An 
influential, though by no means unanimous position of inquiry stresses that legal systems that 
embrace case and judicial discretion tend to adhere more efficiently to changing conditions 
than legal systems that adapt rigidly to formalistic procedures and that rely more strictly on 
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judgments narrowly based on statutory law(Coase, 1960). Posner (1973) argues that although, 
legislators  consider  the  impact  on particular  individuals  and interest  groups when writing 
statutes,  judges  are  forbidden from considering  the  deservedness  of  specific  litigants  and 
therefore more likely to render decisions premised on objective efficiency criteria (Rubin, 
1982, 205). It follows that Common law systems are much more efficient than statutory-based 
systems because inefficient  laws are routinely litigated  and re-litigated  projecting  the  law 
toward more efficient outcomes (Rubin, 1977; Priest, 1977). In another line of thinking, some 
authors argue that statutory law evolves slowly and is subject to a greater degree of inefficient 
political pressures than Common law (Posner, 1973; Bailey & Rubin, 1994). 
3.2.2 Wealth-effects in financial development
This section aims to justify our selection of income-level instrumental variables in the 
empirical phase of the paper. As established by Beck et al. (1999) and sustained by Asongu 
(2010b, 2011a) financial development varies with wealth.  Therefore theoretical and empirical 
literature show considerable disparities across countries with respect to wealth14. This theory 
could be explained from three main positions: financial  intermediary development;  private 
credit & life insurance and stock market development. 
The first stance on financial intermediary development engenders: central bank assets 
to total financial assets, deposit money bank assets to total financial assets, other financial 
institutions assets to total financial assets and deposit money versus central bank assets (Beck 
et al, 1999,13). With respect to this position, central banks loose relative importance as one 
move from low to high-income countries, whereas other financial  institutions gain relative 
importance. Deposit money banks gain relevance versus Central banks with a higher income 
14 “To  assess  the  size  and  activity  of  financial  intermediaries  across  countries,  we  use  the  World  Bank  
classification of  countries  according  to  their  income levels  (World  Development  Indicators  1998).  We  can  
distinguish between four country groups; high income countries with a GNP per capita in 1997 higher than  
$9,656, upper middle income countries with a GNP per capita between $3,126 and $9,655,lower middle income  
countries with a GNP per capita between $786 and $3,125 and low income countries with a GNP per capita of  
less than $786”(Beck et al.,1999, p.13).
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level. Financial depth improves with income levels. Deposit money banks and other financial 
institutions are bigger and much more active in rich countries, while central banks are smaller. 
As stressed by Beck et al. (1999), from the 1960s to 1980s central bank assets increased and 
then decreased again in the 1990s. They emphasized that the ‘deposit money banks versus 
central bank assets’ rise and drop was mainly accounted for by low-income countries.
The second stance focuses on private domestic credit and life insurance across income 
groups (Beck et al., 1999,21). ‘Private credit by other financial institutions’ embodies bank-
like institutions, insurance companies, private pension and provident funds, pool investment 
schemes  and  development  banks;  whereas   insurance  development  entails  life  insurance 
companies, life insurance penetration and life insurance density.  With respect to this position, 
private credit by all five categories of ‘other financial institutions’ augment as we move from 
low to high-income countries.  Private credit by life insurance companies, the life insurance 
penetration and the life insurance density augments with GDP per capita. Interestingly, for the 
first two measures,  the lower-middle income group portrays  the lowest medians. It is also 
interesting to note high-income countries demonstrate a life insurance penetration ten times as 
high as lower-middle income countries and a life insurance density nearly one hundred times 
higher than low-income countries. 
In the third stance, we have stock market development across income groups. Stock 
market development is in 6 categories: stock market capitalization, stock market total value 
traded, stock market turnover, private bond market capitalization, equity issues and long-run 
private debt. This position suggests that there is a significant variation in size, activity and 
efficiency of stock markets across income groups. Countries with higher thresholds of GDP 
per capita have bigger, more active and more efficient financial markets (Beck et al., 1999, 
25). Wealthy countries also possess larger bond markets and issue more equity and private 
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bonds. Stock markets have soared in size, activity and efficiency over the last three decades 
largely as a result of significant changes in higher GDP per capita countries. 
3.2.3 Theoretical background to religion in finance
This section aims to elucidate the theoretical foundation for the empirical validity of 
the religious instruments. Borrowing from Hearn et al.(2011), Islam engenders a system of 
beliefs founded on the interpretation of passages from the Qu’ran and various Had’ith and 
Sunnah  that  are  short  texts  concerning  customs  of  the  Muslim  community  and  relating 
experiences of the prophet Mohammed(Pryor, 2007). These form the basis of Shari’ya law, 
that  permeates  all  areas  of  the  wider  Islamic  system,  including  economics,  finance,  law, 
politics and government (as integral parts) and that have common values of Islamic social 
justice(Asutey,2007).  The Islamic financial  system is premised and regulated on the same 
Shari’ya principles as the overall economy and society (Iqbal, 1997). These govern the nature 
of contracts and the shape of institutions to support the market and regulation of participants’ 
behavior. Individuals within an Islamic financial system will be subject to behavioral norms 
that give rise to very heterogeneous assumptions to those that form the premise of regulation 
in western markets. 
3.2.4 Press-freedom and finance 
In this section, we make a case for the choice of press-freedom instrumental variables. 
From a theoretical stance, press-freedom and the Efficiency Market Hypothesis  (EMH) of 
finance move hand-in-glove. Empirically, freedom of the press is one of the major efficient 
market  mechanisms  and  only  with  unrestricted  press-freedom can  information  be  rapidly 
spread and fully incorporated into asset prices (Guo-Ping, 2008; Asongu,2012). 
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3.3 Scope and positioning of the current paper
The  purpose  of  this  study  is  to  give  a  macroeconomic  context  to  the  growing 
phenomenon of ‘mobile-banking/transfer/payments’. It  contributes  at  the same time to the 
macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and responds to the growing 
field of economic development by means of informal sector promotion, micro finance and 
mobile banking. It suggests a practicable way to disentangle the effects of mobile banking on 
various financial sectors.  Its contribution to the literature is fourfold. Firstly, it corrects one of 
the deepest  empirical  hollows in  the  financial  development  literature  which has  been the 
equation of financial depth in the view of money supply to liquid liabilities: this equation has 
sidelined  a  burgeoning  phenomenon  whose  time  has  come  (mobile  banking).  This  first 
contribution hinges on the thesis that financial depth in the perspective of liquid liabilities as 
applied to developing countries is very misleading because a great chunk of the monetary 
base does not transit through the banking system but via informal networks like the growing 
phenomenon of mobile-transfers (payments/banking). Secondly, the study is in response to a 
growing  call  for  more  scholarly  research  on  the  mobile-finance  nexus  that  is  gaining 
momentum around the world. Various initiatives on the use of the mobile phone are cropping-
up to provide financial  services to those without access to traditional banks, yet relatively 
little  scholarly research explores the incidence of these m-banking/m-payment  systems on 
financial  development(Jonathan & Camilo,2008,1;  Maurer,  2008; Aker & Mbiti,2010,225; 
Thacker & Wright,2012,1). Thirdly,  since empirical research on the phenomenon has been 
hampered  owing  to  lack  of  data,  this  paper  makes  available  macroeconomic  financial 
indicators to the research community that could practically be used to assess the incidence of 
mobile  banking on financial  development.  These indicators  can  easily  be computed  from 
existing World Development Indicators (WDIs) and the Financial Development and Structure 
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Database (FDSD). Fourthly,  we provide relevant recommendations that could guide future 
search and macroeconomic policy on financial trends of the growing phenomenon.  
4. Data and methodology 
4.1 Data
Owing  to  the  methodological  orientation  of  this  paper,  justification  for  a  broad 
database in the choice of data is not much of an empirical constraint. The empirical analysis is 
based on 52 African countries. While financial propositions are computed from the Financial 
Development and Structure Database (FDSD), other variables (but for mobile penetration and 
press-freedom) are obtained from African Development Indicators (ADI) of the World Bank 
(WB). Freedom indicators  originate  from Freedom House whereas the mobile  penetration 
measure is obtained from the African Development Bank (AfDB). The data structure is cross-
sectional and consists of 2003-2009 average growth rates, due to constraints in the time series  
properties of the mobile penetration measurement. In line with existing literature we proxy for 
‘mobile banking/activities’ with the ‘mobile penetration’ rate (Ondiege, 2010; Aker & Mbiti, 
2010).  Control  exogenous  variables  include  economic  considerations  (inflation  &  GDP 
growth), globalization (trade and financial  liberalizations) and political-institutional quality 
(democracy).  The  endogenous  variables  are  Propositions  1-8  suggested  in  the  theoretical 
framework  above  (see  Table  1).  Instrumental  variables  include  legal-origins,  religious-
dominations, income-levels and press-freedom qualities as theoretically justified in Section 
3.2. These instruments have been largely documented in development literature (Beck et al., 
2003; Stulz & Williamson, 2003) as well as recent African finance (Asongu, 2011bcdef) and 
growth (Agbor, 2011) literature. Summary statistics with presentation of countries (Appendix 
1), correlation analysis (Appendix 2) and definition of variables (Appendix 3) are presented in 
the appendices. 
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4.2 Methodology 
4.2.1 Endogeneity 
Aker & Mbiti(2010;225) state: “But while these studies provide some evidence of the  
positive  relationship  between  mobile  phones  and  economic  growth,  they  are  plagued  by  
endogeneity problems. Mobile penetration rates are subject to significant measurement error,  
leading to potential bias in the coefficient estimates”. Whereas mobile phones have a bearing 
on financial development the reverse effect cannot be ruled-out, as some applications in the 
banking industry may require the use of mobile phones. We are therefore confronted here 
with  an  issue  of  endogeneity  owing to  reverse-causality  and omitted  variables,  since  the 
mobile penetration rate is correlated with the error term in the equation of interest. To address 
this issue we shall investigate the presence of endogeneity with the Hausman-test and should 
the results match our concerns (null hypothesis rejected), we employ an estimation technique 
that takes account of the endogeneity issue. 
4.2.2 Estimation technique 
Given the concern for endogeneity,  we borrow from Beck et al.  (2003) and recent 
African finance literature (Asongu, 2011def) in adopting a Two-Stage-Least-Squares (TSLS) 
estimation  approach.  Instrumental  Variable  (IV)  estimation  addresses  the  puzzle  of 
endogeneity and hence avoids the inconsistency of estimated coefficients by Ordinary Least 
Squares (OLS) when the exogenous variables are correlated with the error term in the main 
equation.  The TSLS-IV estimation method adopted by this study will  entail  the following 
steps.
First-stage regression: 
++= itit nlegaloriginelMobileChan )(10 γγ +itreligion)(2γ itlincomeleve )(3γ                        
                               itompressfreed )(4γ+ υα ++ itiX                                               (1) 
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Second-stage regression:
++= itit Mobileopositions )(Pr 10 γγ +itiXβ   µ                                                (2)
The independent control variables are represented by X in the two equations. In Eq.(1) 
and  Eq.(2),  v  and u  respectively denote the disturbance terms. Legal-origins, dominant-
religions,  income-levels  and  press-freedom  qualities  represent  the  instruments.  ‘Mobile 
banking’ and ‘propositions’ are the endogenous variables in the first and second equations 
respectively. 
In the specification of the models, we lay emphasis on the following: (1) justify the 
choice of a TSLS over an OLS estimation technique with the Hausman-test for endogeneity; 
(2)  verify  the  instruments  are  exogenous  to  the  endogenous  components  of  explaining 
variables, conditional on other covariates (control variables); (3)  ensure the instruments are 
valid and not correlated with the error-term in the main equation with an Over-identifying 
Restrictions (OIR) test.
4.2.3 Robustness checks
For robustness purposes, the empirical analysis: (1) uses alternative propositions; (2) 
employs two distinct interchangeable sets of instruments; (3) accounts for endogeneity; (4) 
models  with  Heteroscedasticity  and  Autocorrelation  Consistent(HAC) standard  errors;  (5) 
uses  OLS with HAC standard errors   and RAMSEY RESET(specification tests) for models  
that reflect strict exogeneity in the explaining variables after the Hausman test. 
5. Empirical analysis 
5.1 Presentation of results
 This  empirical  section examines  two key issues:  (1)  the ability  of the  exogenous 
components of mobile banking to explain financial  intermediary development propositions 
and;  (2)  the  ability  of  the  instruments  to  account  for  financial  intermediary  development 
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propositions beyond the mobile banking channel. To make theses investigations, we employ 
the  TSLS-IV estimation  approach with  legal-origins,  income-levels,  religious-dominations 
and press-freedom qualities as instrumental variables. While the first issue is addressed by the 
significance of estimated coefficients, the second is based on results of the Sargan-OIR test. 
The null  hypothesis  of the Sargan test  is  the position that the instruments  do not explain 
financial development propositions beyond the mobile banking channel. Hence a rejection of 
the  null  hypothesis  is  a  rejection  of  the  stance  that  the  instruments  explain  financial 
development propositions only through the mobile banking channel. Ultimately,  this result 
(rejection of null hypothesis) questions the validity of the instruments and substance of the 
mobile banking channel in accounting for cross-country variations in financial intermediary 
propositions.  While  Table  2  entails  the  regressions  of  propositions  using  the  TSLV-IV 
estimation technique, Table 3 investigates the mobile-finance nexus with OLS. The choice of 
an OLS estimation technique as complement to the TSLS approach is contingent on results of 
the  Hausman  test.  The  null  hypothesis  of  this  test  is  the  stance  that  OLS estimates  are 
consistent  and  efficient;  hence  a  rejection  of  this  null  hypothesis  points  to  the  issue  of 
inconsistency in OLS estimates owing to endogeneity and hence lends credit to the choice of 
the  IV estimation  approach.  Overwhelmingly,  the  null  hypothesis  of  the  Hausman  is  not 
rejected  for  most  specifications,  which  lends  credit  to  alternative  modeling  by OLS with 
robust HAC standard errors and RAMSEY RESET. In Table 2 the regressions are duplicated 
with the robust set of instruments and the same results are found. Both Tables 2-3 consist of 
regressions with (Panel B) and without (Panel A) HAC standard errors. 
In Table 2 below, while Panel A summarizes results without HAC standard errors, 
those of Panel B are HAC consistent. With respect to the first issue, the following could be 
established. (1) Mobile banking mitigates formal financial development. This finding is valid 
for  Propositions  1 & 5  which  reflects  absolute  and relative  measures  of  formal  financial 
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development.  In plainer terms, the negative mobile elasticity of formal finance means that 
deposits in the formal financial intermediary sector are decreasing at the advent of mobile 
banking. These deposits are decreasing both in proportions of GDP (Proposition 1) and M2 
(Proposition  5).  While  for  Proposition  5,  the  deposits  in  the  formal  financial  sector  are 
decreasing  to  the  advantage  of  semi-formal  or  informal  financial  sectors  (or  both);  with 
respect  to  Proposition  1,  deposits  are  decreasing  to  the  advantage  of  all  variables  that 
constitute the GDP. (2) Results for Propositions 2 & 6 show that the incidence of mobile-
banking on semi-formal financial development is negative but not significant. This implies, 
specialized  non-bank  and  other  financial  institutions  like  rural  banks,  post  banks,  credit 
unions…etc,  making-up  the  semi-formal  financial  sector  are  also  witnessing  decreasing 
deposits(savings)  with  the  burgeoning  of  mobile  banking.  However  we  do  not  base  our 
interpretation of the incidence of mobile banking on semi-formal finance on regressions of 
Propositions 2 & 6 because they betray a negative explanatory power. We shall deduce the 
effect on this financial sector from results of the last two set of propositions.  (3)Informal 
financial  development  is  positively  affected  by  mobile  banking,  with  the  relative  effect 
(Proposition 7) more pronounced than the absolute effect (Proposition 3). A logical inference 
is that, the informal sector grows more owing to improvements in M2 than in growth of GDP. 
Hence growth of the informal sector is more pronounced at the expense of the formal and 
semi-formal  sectors  (constituents  of  M2)  than  at  the  expense  of  other  macro  economic 
variables (constituents of GDP). Plainly put, the share of informal finance is more relevant in 
M2 growth than in GDP growth. (4) Semi-formal and informal financial development owing 
to mobile banking is positive (Propositions 4 & 8), however the effect is by a thin margin less 
significant  than  the  effect  on  informal  financial  development  (Propositions  3  &  7 
respectively). This slight difference in corresponding weight of elasticities could be explained 
by the negative incidence of mobile banking on semi-formal financial development. Therefore 
28
it logically follows that mobile banking has been beneficial only to the informal sector of the 
financial system. This is further evidenced by the magnitudes and signs of mobile banking 
elasticities pertaining to Propositions 5 and 8: -0.886 and +0.886 respectively. 
We regard to the second issue which is addressed by the results of OIR test, it could be 
established that the instruments are valid since the null hypothesis of the Sargan OIR  test  is 
not overwhelmingly rejected. This implies the instruments do not suffer from endogeneity and 
explain  the  propositions  through no other  mechanisms  but  mobile  banking channels.  The 
findings of Panel A are consistent with those of Panel B. When regressions pertaining to both 
panels are replicated with the second set of instruments, no significant difference  in results is 
found.
Despite the appealing nature of the results in Table 2, two apprehensions have caught 
our attention. (1) But for Propositions 5, 7 & 8, the null hypothesis of the Hausman test is not  
rejected in the other estimations. Failure to reject the null of this test points to the consistency 
and efficiency of estimates modeled by OLS. Hence we are poised to replicate the regressions 
by OLS in Table 3. (2) The need for an OLS estimation is further evidenced by results of the 
Craig-Donald Statistics which show that, the relative bias of TSLS over OLS have critical 
values that exceed the 30% significance level15.
15 TSLS: Two Stage Least Squares. For the Cragg-Donald minimum eigenvalue, critical values (significance levels) for TSLS bias over  
OLS are 15.72(5%), 9.48(10%), 6.08(20%), 4.78(30%). 
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Table 2: Effect of Mobile Banking on Proposition (TSLS) 
Panel A: Regressions without HAC Standard errors
Prop. 1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
Constant 1.460*** -0.001 -0.316*** -0.318*** 2.184*** -0.005 -1.179*** -1.184***
(0.000) (0.913) (0.003) (0.003) (0.000) (0.948) (0.001) (0.001)
Mobile Banking -0.728*** -0.001 0.227*** 0.226*** -0.886*** -0.006 0.893*** 0.886***
(0.000) (0.913) (0.000) (0.000) (0.000) (0.890) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.001 0.0006 -0.001 -0.0004 0.007 0.002 -0.010 -0.007
 (0.918) (0.167) (0.705) (0.883) (0.444) (0.213) (0.298) (0.444)
Hausman 4.010 2.738 3.529 3.577 7.779** 2.456 8.525** 7.779**
(0.134) (0.254) (0.171) (0.167) (0.020) (0.292) (0.014) (0.020)
Sargan –OIR 5.930 4.160 0.543 0.554 2.130 3.988 2.239 2.130
(0.204) (0.384) (0.969) (0.967) (0.711) (0.407) (0.691) (0.711)
Cragg-Donald 1.435 1.435 1.435 1.435 1.435 1.435 1.435 1.435
Adjusted R² 0.213 -0.045 0.260 0.245 0.309 -0.051 0.322 0.309
Fisher 6.096*** 0.961 6.969*** 6.591*** 9.424*** 0.784 9.957*** 9.424***
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Instruments Constant, Lower Middle Income, Middle Income, English, Christians, Free, Partially Free. 
Robust 
Instruments 
Constant, Upper Middle Income, Low Income, French, Islam, Not Free 
Panel B: Regressions with HAC Standard errors
Prop. 1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
Constant 1.460*** -0.001 -0.316* -0.318* 2.184*** -0.005 -1.179*** -1.184***
(0.000) (0.741) (0.072) (0.070) (0.000) (0.818) (0.002) (0.002)
Mobile Banking -0.72*** -0.001 0.227** 0.226** -0.88*** -0.006 0.893*** 0.886***
(0.001) (0.737) (0.019) (0.019) (0.000) (0.629) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.001 0.0006 -0.001 -0.0004 0.007 0.002 -0.010 -0.007
 (0.902) (0.173) (0.649) (0.861) (0.273) (0.221) (0.122) (0.273)
Hausman 4.010 2.738 3.529 3.577 7.779** 2.456 8.525** 7.779**
(0.134) (0.254) (0.171) (0.167) (0.020) (0.292) (0.014) (0.020)
Sargan -OIR 5.930 4.160 0.543 0.554 2.130 3.988 2.239 2.130
(0.204) (0.384) (0.969) (0.967) (0.711) (0.407) (0.691) (0.711)
Adjusted R² 0.213 -0.045 0.260 0.245 0.309 -0.051 0.322 0.309
Fisher 5.489*** 0.927 4.422** 3.836** 13.44*** 0.758 15.060*** 13.448***
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Instruments Constant, Lower Middle Income, Middle Income, English, Christians, Free, Partially Free. 
Robust 
Instruments 
Constant, Upper Middle Income, Low Income, French, Islam, Not Free 
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Prop: Proposition. HAC: Heteroscedasticity and Autocorrelation Consistent. 
FDI:  Foreign  Direct Investment.  OIR:  Overidentifying  Restrictions.  TSLS:  Two Stage  Least  Squares.  For  the Cragg-Donald minimum 
eigenvalue, critical values (significance levels) for TSLS bias over OLS are: 15.72(5%), 9.48(10%), 6.08(20%), 4.78(30%). P-values in  
brackets.
Table 3 presents results based on OLS  without (Panel A) and with (Panel B) HAC 
standard errors. We have already provided justification for the imperative of OLS estimation 
above. In comparison to Table 2, two differences are worth pointing-out. (1) More control 
variables are employed because there are no identification constraints  (difference between 
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endogenous explaining variables and instruments) imperative for instrument validity test16. (2) 
The RAMSEY RESET17 is used to specify the OLS model. Its null hypothesis is the position 
that  nonlinear  combinations  in  the  explaining  variables  have  no  explanatory  power  in 
explaining  the  response  variable.  Hence  a  rejection  of  the  null  hypothesis  points  to 
misspecification of the model. 
Only the first issue is addressed by Table 3. Based on the significance of estimated 
coefficients and findings of the RESET, the following could be established in comparison to 
results of Table 2. (1) Propositions 1 to 4 entail insignificant regressions. Only the mobile 
banking elasticity of Proposition 1 is valid, however our failure to take it into consideration 
hinges on equation misspecification; owing to rejection of the null hypothesis of the RESET. 
(2) The significance and signs of mobile banking elasticities of Propositions 5, 7 & 8 are 
compatible  with  those  in  Table  2.  Hence  we  do  not  elucidate  them further  because  the 
economic interpretations are similar. (3) Regressions pertaining to Propositions 2, 3, 4 & 6 do 
not merit any attention because their estimates do not jointly enter significantly at 1%, 5% or 
10%  significance  levels  (see  critical  values  pertaining  of  the  Fisher  test  for  these 
propositions). (4)In terms of robust standard errors, findings of Panel A are HAC consistent in 
Panel B. 
16 A Sargan OIR test for instrument validity is only applicable in the presence of over-identification (instruments 
greater  than  endogenous  explaining  variables  by  at  least  one  degree  of  freedom).   In  the  cases  of  exact-
identification (instruments equal to endogenous explaining variables) and under-identification (instruments less 
than endogenous explaining variables) the test is not applicable. 
17 Regression Equation Specification Error Test. 
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Table 3: Effect of Mobile Banking on Propositions (OLS) 
Panel A: Regressions without HAC Standard errors
Prop. 1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
Constant 1.641*** -0.005 -0.062 -0.067   1.651*** -0.024 -0.626*** -0.651***
(0.000) (0.598) (0.575) (0.549) (0.000) (0.386) (0.006) (0.003)
Mobile Banking -0.868*** 0.002 0.078 0.080 -0.565*** 0.014 0.551*** 0.565***
(0.000) (0.671) (0.218) (0.212) (0.000) (0.365) (0.000) (0.000)
Inflation -0.0006 -0.0003* -0.002 -0.002 0.008* -0.001** -0.007 -0.008*
 (0.931) (0.083) (0.318) (0.255) (0.066) (0.042) (0.126) (0.066)
Growth 0.026 0.0009 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 -0.008 -0.006
(0.210) (0.121) (0.751) (0.650) (0.613) (0.153) (0.497) (0.613)
Trade -0.0003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000
(0.736) (0.184) (0.947) (0.852) (0.952) (0.221) (0.825) (0.952)
Democracy 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.0002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.897) (0.970) (0.205) (0.214) (0.351) (0.725) (0.342) (0.351)
FDI -0.006 -0.0006** 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.002** 0.013* 0.010
(0.541) (0.040) (0.344) (0.457) (0.104) (0.012) (0.057) (0.104)
Adjusted R² 0.3489 0.036 0.045 0.044 0.489 0.143 0.463 0.489
Fisher 3.947*** 1.207 1.263 1.254 6.277*** 1.920 5.750*** 6.277***
RAMSEY RESET 2.611* 3.080* 0.769 0.923 0.248 8.710*** 0.259 0.248
(0.093) (0.063) (0.474) (0.41) (0.782) (0.001) (0.774) (0.782)
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
Panel B: Regressions with HAC Standard errors
Prop. 1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8
Constant 1.641*** -0.005 -0.062 -0.067 1.651*** -0.024 -0.626* -0.651*
(0.000) (0.544) (0.747) (0.726) (0.000) (0.418) (0.085) (0.068)
Mobile Banking -0.868*** 0.002 0.078 0.080 -0.56*** 0.014 0.551*** 0.565***
(0.000) (0.630) (0.475) (0.461) (0.006) (0.360) (0.009) (0.006)
Inflation -0.0006 -0.0003 -0.002 -0.002 0.008** -0.001 -0.007 -0.008**
 (0.914) (0.208) (0.207) (0.141) (0.034) (0.187) (0.112) (0.034)
Growth 0.026 0.0009 0.002 0.003 0.006 0.002 -0.008 -0.006
(0.124) (0.203) (0.727) (0.614) (0.545) (0.258) (0.444) (0.545)
Trade -0.0003 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.000 0.0001 -0.0001 -0.000
(0.704) (0.230) (0.945) (0.846) (0.957) (0.346) (0.847) (0.957)
Democracy 0.001 0.000 -0.003 -0.003 0.004 0.0002 -0.004 -0.004
(0.878) (0.961) (0.150) (0.153) (0.299) (0.656) (0.297) (0.299)
FDI -0.006 -0.0006** 0.003 0.002 -0.010 -0.002** 0.013* 0.010
(0.570) (0.017) (0.358) (0.470) (0.118) (0.029) (0.082) (0.118)
Adjusted R² 0.348 0.036 0.045 0.044 0.489 0.143 0.463 0.489
Fisher 4.399*** 1.627 0.912 0.936 4.998*** 1.310 3.586*** 4.998***
RAMSEY RESET 2.611* 3.080* 0.769 0.923 0.248 8.710*** 0.259 0.248
(0.093) (0.063) (0.474) (0.41) (0.782) (0.001) (0.774) (0.782)
Observations 51 51 51 51 51 51 51 51
*,**,***: significance levels of 10%, 5% and 1% respectively. Prop: Proposition. OLS: Ordinary Least Squares. HAC: Heteroscedasticity  
and Autocorrelation Consistent. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. P-values in brackets. 
5.2 Retrospect to tested hypotheses 
Hypothesis 1: The informal financial sector (a previously missing component in the definition 
of money supply: M2) is significantly affected by mobile-penetration (banking). True
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We have observed from the findings that the informal financial intermediary sector is 
positively affected by the mobile banking phenomenon. 
Hypothesis  2:  Disentangling  different  components  of  the  existing  measurement  (financial 
system)  into  formal  (banking  sector)  and  semi-formal  (other  financial  institutions)  sector 
indicators could improve understanding of the mobile-finance nexus. True
Based on the weight of available empirical evidence, mobile banking has a negative 
incidence on the depth(deposits) of formal and semi-formal financial sectors, with the effect 
on the former more detrimental than that on the later. 
Hypothesis 3:  Introducing measures of sector importance could ameliorate the capacity to 
understand  how  improvements  of  shares  in  different  sectors  of  the  financial  system  are 
affected by the mobile-finance nexus. To put this in other terms, the need to evaluate how one 
financial  sector  develops  at  the expense of  another  (and vice-versa)  and the incidence  of 
mobile banking on these changes could be crucial in orienting policy-making. True
By introducing measures of financial sector importance, we have been able observe 
that  improvements  in  M2 resulting  from mobile  finance  are  captured  exclusively  by  the 
informal banking sector. It is a substantial wake-up call for scholarly research on informal 
financial intermediary development indicators which will oriented monetary policy; since a 
great chunk of the monetary base(M0) in less developed countries is now captured by mobile 
banking related activities. 
5.3 Further discussion of results, policy implications and future directions  
Before we dive into further discussion of the results, it is imperative to outline the 
intuition motivating this paper. (1) The growing relevance of mobile banking in developing 
countries needs a macroeconomic financial development context. However, this aspect has 
been fundamentally sidelined in the conception, definition and application of financial depth. 
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(2)  Some  voices  have  expressed  sentiments  on  the  instrumentality  of  mobile  banking  in 
African  development  (The  Economist,  2008;  Aker  &  Mbiti,  2010,  208).  This  paper  has 
assessed if these sentiments and slogans are material with respect to financial development. 
(3) “The existing empirical evidence on the effect  of  mobile phone coverage and services  
suggest that the mobile phone can potentially serve as a tool for economic development in  
Africa. But this evidence while certainly encouraging remains limited. First, while economic  
studies have focused on the effects of mobile phones for particular countries or markets, there  
is  little  evidence  showing  that  this  has  translated  into  macroeconomic  gains…”(Aker  & 
Mbiti,2010,224). (4)As postulated by Maurer (2008) and sustained in subsequent literature 
(Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Thacker & Wright, 2012), scholarly research on the adoption and 
socioeconomic impacts of m-banking systems in the developing world is scares. From a broad 
spectrum,  most  studies on mobile  banking have been theoretical  and qualitative in nature 
(Maurer, 2008; Jonathan & Camilo, 2008; Merritt, 2010; Thacker & Wright, 2012). The slim 
existing  empirical  studies  hinge  on  country-specific  and  micro-level  data  (collected  from 
surveys) for the most part (Demombynes & Thegeya ,2012). 
The purpose of this study has been to give a  macroeconomic financial context to the 
growing phenomenon of ‘mobile-banking/transfer/payments’. This paper has contributed at 
the same time to the macroeconomic literature on measuring financial development and has 
responded  to  the  growing  field  of  economic  development  by  means  of  informal  sector 
promotion and micro finance. It has suggested a practicable way to disentangle the effects of 
mobile  banking  on  various  financial  sectors.   Its  contribution  to  the  literature  has  been 
fourfold.  Firstly,  it  has  corrected  one  of  the  deepest  empirical  hollows  in  the  financial  
development literature which has been the equation of financial depth in the view of money 
supply to liquid liabilities: this equation has sidelined a burgeoning phenomenon whose time 
has come (mobile  banking).  This first  contribution has hinged on the thesis that financial 
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depth  in  the  perspective  of  liquid  liabilities  as  applied  to  developing  countries  is  very 
misleading because a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit through the banking 
system  but  via  informal  networks  like  the  growing  phenomenon  of  mobile-
transfers(payments/banking). Secondly, the study has been in response to a growing call for 
more  scholarly  research  on  the  mobile-finance  nexus;  a  phenomenon  that  is  gaining 
momentum around the world. Various initiatives on the use of the mobile phone to provide 
financial  services  to  those  without  access  to  traditional  banks  have  been  developed,  yet 
relatively  little  scholarly  research  explores  the  incidence  of  these  m-banking/m-payment 
systems  on  financial  development(Jonathan  &  Camilo,2008,1;  Maurer,  2008; Aker  & 
Mbiti,2010,225;  Thacker  &  Wright,2012,1).  Thirdly,  since  empirical  research  on  the 
phenomenon has been hampered owing to lack of data, this paper has made available financial 
macroeconomic financial indicators to the research community that could practically be used 
to assess the mobile-finance nexus. These indicators can easily be computed from existing 
World Development Indicators (WDIs) and Financial Development and Structure Database 
(FDSD). Fourthly, we will provide relevant policy recommendations that could guide future 
search and macroeconomic policy on the growing phenomenon
In  this  seminal  assessment  of  the  incidence  of  mobile  banking  on  financial 
intermediary development in Africa, we have used two definitions of the financial system: the 
traditional IFS (2008) and Asongu (2011a) measures of financial  sector importance.  Eight 
propositions  have resulted from cross  examination  of  these definitions,  upon which three 
hypotheses  have  been  tested.  Two  broad  findings  have  been  established.  (1)  When  the 
financial system is based only on banks and other financial institution (IFS, 2008), mobile 
banking has a negative incidence on the financial system (formal and semi-formal sectors). 
(2) However, when a previously missing informal-financial sector component is added to the 
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conception and definition of the financial  system (Asongu, 2011a),  mobile  banking has a 
positive incidence on informal financial intermediary development. 
Ultimately mobile banking is a powerful means of delivering savings services to the 
millions of people in Africa who have a cell phone but not a bank account. It has a number of 
edges over traditional banking methods as it breaks down geographical constraints; it  also 
offers  other  advantages  such  as  immediacy,  efficiency  and  security.  This  could  partly 
elucidate  the  reason  the  incidence  of  the  phenomenon  has  been  positive  to  the  informal 
financial sector to the detriment of the formal banking system.
Three practical implications have resulted from the findings. (1) There is a burgeoning 
role  of  informal  finance  in  developing  countries.  (2)  The  incidence  of  the  growing 
phenomenon of mobile banking cannot be effectively assessed at a macroeconomic level by 
traditional financial development indicators. (3) It is a wake-up call for scholarly research on 
informal  financial  intermediary development  indicators which will  guide monetary policy; 
since a great chunk of the monetary base (M0) in less developed countries is now captured by 
mobile-banking.
Apart  from rethinking  monetary  policy  transmission  mechanisms,  other  future 
research directions could include: (1) ascertaining whether and how mobile phones can lead to 
poverty reduction  through growth and financial  development;  (2)  an assessment  of  short, 
medium and long-term incidences of mobile phones on financial development is also worthy 
of note; (3) consequences of regulation on mobile penetration in the financial sector; (4) last  
but not the least,  monetary policy tools that could combat  inflation resulting from mobile 
banking activities.
6. Conclusion
Nothing is  more  powerful  than a phenomenon whose time has  come.  What  is  the 
macroeconomic empirical context of growing ‘mobile-banking/transfer/payments’? Perhaps 
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one of the deepest empirical  hollows in the financial  development  literature  has been the 
equation of financial depth in the perspective of monetary supply to liquid liabilities. This 
equation has put on the margin,  a burgeoning phenomenon whose time has come: mobile 
banking. The purpose of this paper has been to propose new financial indicators in the light of 
mobile banking. To assess our propositions, we have decomposed money supply into formal, 
semi-formal and informal sectors and then assessed the incidence of mobile banking on each 
constituent.  Thus  the  IFS (2008)  definition  of  the  financial  system has  been extended  to 
incorporate an informal financial sector in line with Asongu(2011a). Three hypotheses based 
on eight  propositions  have  been  tested  using  a  plethora  of  endogeneity-robust  and  HAC 
standard errors estimation techniques. 
Based on the findings, the informal financial sector (a previously missing component 
in  the  definition  of  money  supply:  M2)  is  significantly  positively  impacted  by  mobile-
penetration (banking), while the incidence of mobile banking is negative on formal and semi-
formal financial intermediary development. Three broad implications have been established 
from the results. (1) There is a burgeoning role of informal finance in developing countries. 
(2)  The  incidence  of  the  growing  phenomenon  of  mobile  banking  cannot  be  effectively 
assessed at a macroeconomic level by traditional financial development indicators. (3) It is a 
wake-up call for scholarly research on informal financial intermediary development indicators 
which will guide monetary policy;  since a great chunk of the monetary base (M0) in less 
developed countries is now captured by mobile-banking.
Since empirical research on the phenomenon has been hampered by lack of data, we 
have  made  available  macroeconomic  financial  indicators  to  the  research  community.  The 
present paper has been in response to the numerous calls on the research gap in the literature 
that emphasize the need for research on m-banking/m-payments. The mobile-finance nexus is 
gaining momentum, yet relatively little scholarly research explores the incidence of these m-
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banking/m-payment  (systems)  on financial  development.  The paper  has contributed at  the 
same  time  to  the  macroeconomic  literature  on  measuring  financial  development  and  has 
responded to the growing field of economic  development  by means  of  informal  financial 
sector promotion,  microfinance and mobile banking. It has suggested a practicable way to 
disentangle the effects of mobile banking on various financial sectors. The missing-link in the 
literature on which the paper is motivated is that liquid liabilities as applied to developing 
countries is misleading because a great chunk of the monetary base does not transit through 
the  banking  system but  via  informal  networks  like  the  growing  phenomenon  of  mobile-
banking(finance).
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Appendices 
Appendix 1: Summary statistics and presentation of countries
Panel   A: Summary Statistics
Mean S.D Min. Max. Obser.
GDP-based 
financial 
development 
indicators
Proposition 1 0.271 0.225 0.042 0.892 52
Proposition 2 0.002 0.007 -0.005 0.041 52
Proposition 3 0.066 0.054 -0.145 0.217 52
Proposition 4 0.068 0.055 -0.145 0.216 52
Measures of 
financial sector 
importance 
Proposition 5 0.753 0.173 0.272 1.336 52
Proposition 6 0.006 0.031 -0.027 0.192 52
Proposition 7 0.239 0.173 -0.336 0.727 52
Proposition 8 0.246 0.173 -0.336 0.727 52
Mobile Phone  Penetration 1.674 0.217 1.043 2.242 52
Inflation 117.95 764.60 1.953 5304.8 52
GDP growth 4.760 3.087 -6.959 12.894 52
Trade 82.221 37.303 34.609 211.28 52
Foreign Direct Investment 4.675 4.731 0.062 23.203 52
Democracy 2.906 3.709 -7.428 10.000 52
Instrumental 
Variables 
English Common  law 0.384 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
French  Civil law 0.615 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
Christian 0.615 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
Islam 0.384 0.491 0.000 1.000 52
Upper Middle Income 0.192 0.397 0.000 1.000 52
Lower Middle Income 0.230 0.425 0.000 1.000 52
Low Income 0.576 0.498 0.000 1.000 52
Middle Income 0.423 0.498 0.000 1.000 52
Total Freedom 0.163 0.346 0.000 1.000 52
Partial Freedom 0.362 0.432 0.000 1.000 52
No Freedom 0.474 0.473 0.000 1.000 52
Panel B: Presentation of Countries
Algeria, Angola, Benin, Botswana, Burkina Faso, Burundi, Cameroon, Cape Verde, Central African Republic,  
Chad, Congo Democratic Republic, Congo Republic, Ivory Coast, Djibouti, Egypt, Equatorial Guinea, Ethiopia, 
Gabon,  The Gambia, Ghana, Guinea, Guinea Bissau, Kenya, Lesotho, Liberia, Libya, Madagascar, Mali, Malawi, 
Mauritania, Mauritius, Morocco, Mozambique, Namibia, Niger, Nigeria, Rwanda, Sao Tome & Principe, Senegal,  
Seychelles, Sierra Leone, Somalia, South Africa, Sudan, Swaziland, Togo, Tunisia, Uganda, Zambia, Zimbabwe, 
Tanzania, Comoros.
S.D: Standard Deviation.  Min:Minimum.  Max: Maximum.  Obser. Observations. F.D: Financial Development. 
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Appendix 2: Correlation analysis 
Propositions Mobile 
P.
Control Variables
Prop.1 Prop.2 Prop.3 Prop.4 Prop.5 Prop.6 Prop.7 Prop.8 Inflation GDPg Trade FDI Demo
1.000 0.040 0.186 0.190 0.538 -0.041 -0.532 -0.538 -0.593 -0.055 -0.210 0.290 0.338 0.210 Prop.1
1.000 -0.009 0.126 -0.055 0.966 -0.118 0.055 0.048 0.018 0.061 -0.031 -0.179 0.094 Prop.2
1.000 0.990 -0.596 -0.050 0.605 0.596 0.238 -0.185 -0.177 0.004 0.187 -0.239 Prop.3
1.000 -0.598 0.080 0.584 0.598 0.243 -0.181 -0.167 -0.000 0.171 -0.224 Prop.4
1.000 -0.095 -0.983 -1.000 -0.492 0.208 0.039 0.242 0.050 0.270 Prop.5
1.000 -0.085 0.095 0.081 0.023 0.051 -0.078 -0.304 0.120 Prop.6
1.000 0.983 0.477 -0.213 -0.048 -0.227 -0.023 -0.292 Prop.7
1.000 0.492 -0.208 -0.039 -0.242 -0.050 -0.270 Prop.8
1.000 -0.031 0.255 -0.444 -0.231 0.030 Mobile P.
1.000 -0.569 0.026 0.042 -0.077 Inflation
1.000 -0.107 -0.217 -0.008 GDPg
1.000 0.541 -0.100 Trade
1.000 -0.167 FDI
1.000 Demo
Prop: Proposition. P:Penetration. GDPg: GDP growth rate. FDI: Foreign Direct Investment. Demo: Democracy. 
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Appendix 3: Variable definitions
Variables Signs Variable definitions Sources
Trade Openness Trade Exports plus Imports(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Capital  Openness FDI Foreign Direct Investment(% of GDP) World Bank(WDI)
Democracy Demo Institutionalized Democracy World Bank(WDI)
Mobile Phone Penetration Mobpen Seven year average growth rate(% of population) AfDB
Inflation Infl Consumer Price Index(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Economic Prosperity GDPg GDP Growth(annual %) World Bank(WDI)
Freedom  Free Press Freedom Quality Freedom House
WDI: World Bank Development Indicators.  FDSD: Financial Development and Structure Database. FD: Financial Development. 
AfDB: African Development Bank. 
Appendix 4: Segments of the financial system by degree of formality in Paper’s context 
Paper’s context Tiers Definitions Institutions Principal Clients
Formal 
financial 
system
IMF 
Definition 
of Financial 
System 
from 
International 
Financial 
Statistics 
(IFS)
Formal 
Financial 
sector 
(Deposit 
Banks)
Formal 
banks
Licensed by 
central bank
Commercial 
and 
development 
banks 
Large businesses, 
Government
Semi-
formal  and 
informal 
financial 
systems
Semi-formal 
financial 
sector
(Other 
Financial 
Institutions)
Specialized 
non-bank 
financial 
institutions
Rural banks, 
Post banks, 
Saving and 
Loan 
Companies, 
Deposit 
taking Micro 
Finance banks 
Large rural 
enterprises, 
Salaried Workers, 
Small and medium 
enterprises 
Other non-
bank 
financial 
institutions
Legally 
registered but 
not licensed 
as financial 
institution by 
central bank 
and 
government
Credit 
Unions, 
Micro 
Finance 
NGOs
Microenterprises, 
Entrepreneurial 
poor
Missing 
component 
in IFS 
definition
Informal 
financial 
sector
Informal 
banks
Not legally 
registered at 
national 
level(though 
may be linked 
to a registered 
association)
Savings 
collectors, 
Savings and 
credit 
associations, 
Money 
lenders
Self-employed 
poor
Source (Asongu,2011a)
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